DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A PATENT ON DEMURRER TO A BILL IN EQUITY by unknown
DEMURRER TO BILL IN EQUITY.
DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A PATENT ON
DEMURRER TO A BILL IN EQUITY.
Probably in no branch of Federal Practice have the
length and cost of the records become so voluminous as in patent
cases. Nowhere else are the rules of evidence so grossly disre-
garded as in the taking of proofs in this class of cases. The
length and irrelevance of cross examination have become a bur-
den to courts and the contesting parties, and in several cases
recently this tendency has been severely reprimanded by the
courts.1 Undoubtedly the circumstances under which the evi-
dence in such causes is taken-before an examiner who has no
power to exclude anything-tend to produce such unscientific and
exhaustive records as are frequently presented to the court.
When we cbunt the fees of counsel and witnesses, the services
of the master and stenographer or type writer, the printing, some-
times done twice, and the time and labor expended by the coun-
sel and court in threshing out the wheat from the straw on the
final hearing, we can readily imagine the enormous expense of
an elaborate patent suit. The result of this tendency is not only
in severe reprimands by the courts, but in a growing desire to
dispose of the vital question in a patent case before the final
hearing. To this desire is undoubtedly due the practice which
is the subject of this paper.
This practice is substantially as follows: Where a bill of
equity prays for an injunction against the infringement of a
patent, the defendant may raise the question of the validity of the
patent in suit, not only by answer and proof, but also by
demurrer to the bill on the ground that the patent is invalid on
its face. Necessarily the practice of demurring to the bill on
this ground must be limited in its application, as ordinarily it is
impossible for the courts to pass on a complex and intricate
patent without the assistance of proofs. On the other hand,
where the patent is for a simple device which relates to a familiar
subject, and may be easily understood without the aid of expert
I Ecaubert v. Appleton, 67 F. R. 924; City of Carlsbad v. Kutnow, I F.
R. 172.
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testimony or extrinsic evidence, the courts have generally
accepted the doctrine that the validity of the patent may be
determined on demurrer to the original bill, and in some circuits
a number of cases have been disposed of in this manner.
It is the purpose of this paper to review briefly a number of
the leading cases of the different circuit and Supreme Courts in
an endeavor to ascertain the various conditions, limitations, and
tests applicable in the conduct of cases of this description.
The practice appears to be of recent growth, the cases are still
few in number, and only during the last year or two has the
practice been stamped by the Supreme Court with its seal of
approval.
In considering the general practice of dismissing a bill on the
ground of invalidity of the patent in suit, the point being raised
by a demurrer, a start must be made from a well settled rule of
patent practice, which is, that the question of the validity of a
patent is always open to the consideration of the court, whether
the point is raised in the pleading and proof or not. Where suit
is brought on a patent, and the answer does not set up the
defense that the patent is unpatentable, the court may sua sponzte
declare the patent void, even if the objection is not taken by
counsel. This rule has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
a number of cases of which Dunbar v. Myers' and Brown v.
Piper5 are generally considered the leading. The rule is not
unfair nor unjust to the complainants in a suit brought on letters
patent, for if the patent is void, because the device or contrivance
described therein is not patentable, it would ill become a court
of equity to render money decrees in favor of a complainant for
the infringement of a patent which the court could see was void
on its face for want of invention.4
If the Supreme Court on appeal can without reference to the
pleadings and proof, but merely from an examination of the
patent itself say that the patent is void, there appears to be no
valid reason why a court of original jurisdiction cannot do the
same, especially where the point is raised on demurrer.' If the
pleadings are not necessary to the court, why have them? Why
not bring the point up immediately without the necessity of fur-
ther pleadings and elaborate proof?
A patent may be declared invalid from a number of causes,
Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 187.
Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 44.
4 Slawson v. Grand St. R. R. Co., 107 U. S. 619.
A West v. Rae, 33 F. R. 45.
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and the cases in which the validity is tested by demurrer may
roughly be divided into three classes-ist, those in which the
patent is alleged to have some inherent defect apparent on its
face; 2d, those in which the patent is alleged to be invalid in
view of the state of the prior art as set forth in the bill; 3d, those
in which the prior art must be drawn from (i) common knowl-
edge of mankind of which the court takes judicial notice, or
from (2) the specification of the patent itself, and in view of
which prior art the patent is alleged to lack invention.
It should be noted that in these cases, the patent itself is
made part of the bill. This may be done by setting forth the
patent in full, or the bill may make profert of the patent, or the
patent may be attached as an exhibit. Where a formal profert
is made or the patent attached as an exhibit, the courts have held
that this is sufficient to make the letters patent part of the bill.
6
i. Where there is something in the patent itself which is
repugnant to the principles of the patent law, as for instance
that the patent is for a law of nature,
7 or the function of a
machine,8 the courts have not hesitated to declare the patent
void, on demurrer, as the defect is apparent on the face of the
patent.
2. A somewhat different question arises where the invalidity
of a patent is established not from some defect inherent in the
patent, but by extrinsic evidence. In the trial of patent cases
usually the most important element in passing on the validity of
a patent is what is known as the state of the prior art; which is
proof of what is old and in general use at the date of the inven-
tion.' It may consist of printed or written documents; of oral
testimony of witnesses familiar with the particular art to which
the invention applies; or of specimens and exhibits of devices
then employed."0 This extrinsic evidence or prior art is neces-
sary to show what was old, to distinguish what was new, and to
aid the court in construing the patent.
If a patent has no inherent cause for being declared void, and
extrinsic evidence is necessary to prove unpatentability, how can
such evidence be presented to the court for its consideration on
6 Heaton Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Schlochtmeyer, 69 F. R. 594;
Dickerson v. Greene, 53 F. R. 247; Bogart v. Hinds, 25 F. R. 484; Indurated
Fibre Industries Co. v. Grace, 52 F. R. 124.
7 Wall v. Leck, 61 F. R. 291; 66 F. R. 552.
8 Locomotive Works v. Medart, 15 Supreme Court Reporter, 751; 158 U.
S. 63.
9 Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 44.
10 Robinson on Patents, Sec. io2o.
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demurrer, where the allegations are merely the allegations of the
complaint? When the complaint contains statements or offers
exhibits which set forth the prior art, this difficulty is removed.
Take for example a case where two patents of different date are
sued upon in the same bill. Obviously the court may consider
the two patents together, and from such consideration may decide
that there is no advance in the art in the second patent over the
first dated, and consequently that the second is not patentable in
view of the first. In Bottle Seal Company v. De La Vergne
Bottle and Seal Company," the court had two patents of differ-
ent dates before it, and in considering the second, took the
first as exhibiting the state of the prior art. An interesting case
of this character is that of Russell v. Kern,'2 where a bill in
equity was brought on ten patents, and an injunction prayed for.
The four earlier patents were found to have expired before suit
was commenced, and the fifth in date before the return day.
The court dismissed the bill in respect to these five patents for
want of equity. But the first five patents, being in the bill, were
considered by the court as setting forth the prior art, and on
demurrer it was held no invention existed in the last five patents
over the first five.
Another case of this character arises where suit is brought on
a re-issued patent. In a re-issue the original patent must have
been surrendered and the re-issue applied for within two years of
the date of the granting of the original."' If the original patent
and the re-issue are both made parts of the bill, as exhibits, etc.,
and a delay of more than two years appears in applying for the
re-issue, not explained by special circumstances, showing it to be
reasonable, the Supreme Court has held that laches may be
availed of as a defense, upon a general demurrer for want of
equity.
14
3. But take the third class of cases; where no earlier patent
is set forth in the bill, and merely the patent sued upon and
under consideration is before the court, and it contains no
inherent defect. The pleadings do not present any prior art
from which the court may decide the question of patentability.
The case of Brown v. Piper" before the Supreme Court in
1875, was a case decided upon bill and answer in the usual form,
U 47 F. R. 61.
22 69 F. R. 97.
12 iller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350.
14 Woolensak v. Reiher, u15 U. S. 96.
15 91 U. S. 37.
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and the patent in issue was for a process of preserving fish by
freezing. In passing on the validity of the patent the court
went entirely outside of the pleadings and proof, and took judicial
notice of the ice cream freezer as a complete anticipation of the
alleged invention. Justice Swain, in. delivering the opinion, said:
"Of private and special facts, in trials in equity and at law, the
court or jury, as the case may be, is bound carefully to exclude
the influence of all previous knowledge. But there are many
things of which judicial cognizance may be taken. Facts of uni-
versal notoriety need not be proved. Among the things of which
judicial notice is taken, are: the law of nations; the general cus-
toms and usages of merchants; things which must happen accor-
ding to the laws of nature; the meaning of words in the vernac-
ular language, etc., etc. Courts will take notice of whatever is
generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction; and, if
the judge's memory is at fault, he may refresh it by resorting to
any means for that purpose which he may deem safe and pro-
per. This extends to such matters of science as are involved in
cases brought before him." The court also said: "It is known
that Lord Bacon applied snow to poultry to preserve it. He said
the process succeeded excellently well. The experiment was
made in his old age, imprudently, and brought on his last ill-
ness." Whether the court in its recital of this lamentable result
of Lord Bacon's experiment would uphold the doctrine that all
such facts of history may be taken judicial cognizance of, it is
not safe to say. But the practice of taking notice of matters of
common knowledge in patent cases, even when not set up in the
pleadings, has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court also in a
-number of other decisions.16
The question arose in i885 in the Circuit Court, in the case
of Dick v. Oil Well Supply Company" whether, where there was
no answer, and the issue was raised upon demurrer to the bill,
the court could also take judicial notice of matters of common
-knowledge in passing upon the validity of the patent. In this
case and in that of Kalotype Engraving Company v. Hoke" in
x887, the courts declared that if facts existed of which the court
was bound to take judicial notice, and these facts clearly estab-
lished want of invention, undoubtedly the patent could be
declared void on demurrer. But in neither case was the court
willing to decide it on that ground, and the defendants were
ordered to proceed in the usual manner by answer and proof.
,6 Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 187; Slawson v. R.R., 107 U. S. 649.
17 5 F. R. o5.
18 30 F. R. 444.
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In the same year as the latter of the above cases, a suit was
brought in the second circuit on a patent for a design for rubber
mats, having corrugations for producing varied effects of light
and shade. 9 The defendants demurred on the ground that there
was no invention, and Judge Wallace sustained the demurrer,
taking judicial cognizance of wood, plaster, and corduroy cloth,
in which depressions and elevations in the surface produce varia-
tions in light and shade. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court"
thg decision of the circuit court was reversed, and it was held that
the demurrer should have been overruled. "Whether or not the
design is new is a question of fact, which whatever our impres-
sions may be, we do not think it proper to determine by taking
judicial knowledge of the various designs which may have come
under our observation. It is a question which may and should be
raised by answer, and settled by proper proof."
The case of West v. Rae, 33 F. R. 45, decided by Judge Blod-
gett in the Seventh Circuit in the same year was the first wherein
facts in common knowledge noticed judicially by the court, a
view of mechanical patent was held void on demurrer, and hence
has been looked upon as a leading case on the subject in the subse-
quent decisions. The patent was for paper bags for packing
blankets, both ends of the bags to be pasted or otherwise secured.
The court held the patent anticipated by bags for flour, grocer-
ies, etc., in common use, of which he took judicial notice. In
his opinion Judge Blodgett said: "I am not aware that the
practice of raising by demurrer the question, based on common
knowledge, that a patent is void for want of novelty, has the
direct sanction of any adjudged case, but the books abound in
cases where the court has of its common knowledge sua sponte
held patents void for want of patentable novelty. In the light
of these authorities I cannot see why, in a suit for infringement
of a patent so clearly and baldly void as this, the court ought not
to save the defendant from the vexations and expense of a trial
upon proofs by sustaining the demurrer to the bill, "
In the following year Judge Shipman in the case of Blessing
v. Copper Works,2' which was a case at law, said: "It is well
settled that in a bill in equity for the infringement of a patent,
if the patent is void on its face by reason of want of patentable
invention or of novelty, when the pre-existing device is a thing
19 N. Y. Belting & Packg. Co. v. N. J. Car-Spring & Rubber Co., 3o F. R.
785.
20 137 U. S. 445.
2134 F. R. 753.
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in common knowledge and use of people throughout the country,
the court may stop at the instrument itself, and without looking
beyond it, adjudge in favor of the defendant."
Following these two cases come a long line of decisions, some
in almost every circuit, in which demurrers have been brought to
the bill on the ground of the apparent invalidity of the patent,
and whichever way the particular case was decided, the practice
has been upheld. Judge Blodgett, in a later case2 said that
at the time he announced his decision in West v. Rae (supra), he
stated that the effect might be to encourage counsel to demur to
bills for infringement of patents in cases where they, from their
special knowledge of the art, might be of opinion that the device
covered by the patent was old. And his anticipations in that
respect were fully realized, as that decision produced in his court
a bountiful crop of demurrers in this class of cases."3  The
reason for this is obvious. The great cost of a long litigation is
avoided if the demurrer is sustained as the validity of the patent
is determined at the outset.
An exception to the general acquiescence in this practice came
in the form of a vigorous protest by Judge Putnam in the First Cir-
cuit, in the case of Industries Company v. Grace, 52 F. R. 124,
and reiterated in Henderson v. Tompkins, 6o F. R. 758. The
latter is a copyright case but the practice under consideration
received elaborate treatment therein. "No doubt," said Judge
Putnam, "there is a limited class of cases in which the court
must on demurrer, from the standpoint of judicial notice, disre-
gard allegations in the bill of novelty, patentable invention, and
utility. But it must be noted that there is a broad distinction
between cases heard on bill, answer and proof, and those on
demurrer, although it may be that iii the former class the court
may sometimes be compelled to dispose of questions of originality
from the same common knowledge and experience which it is
asked to apply in disposing of this demurrer. As Brown v. Piper
(sup a) was heard on bill, answer and proofs, the complainant
has full opportunity, and all the facts were before the court. On
such a record, the court as judges of the fact, could with propri-
ety, say that there was nothing on the face of the patent itself
which could require its attention. This distinction is not a vain
one, because erroneous matter of law, if perpetuated, becomes a
deformity, while findings of fact, if likewise erroneous, are swept
22 Eclipse Mfg. Co. v. Adkins, 36 F. R. 555.
3 Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Ill. Iron & Bolt Co., 42 F. R. 52; Buck-
ingham v. Springfield Iron Co., 51 F. R. 236.
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away and become a portion of the undigested mass of such find-
ings. Assumption on the part of courts of knowledge which they
may not in fact possess, followed by numerous dismissals of suits
on demurrer would- involve the hazard of barring meritorious
causes contrary to the express allegations of the bill."
A point is raised in this quotation particularly worthy of
notice. The learned judge states that the court to declare a
patent void on demurrer, must disregard the allegations in the
bill of novelty, patentable invention, and utility. The usual, if
not invariable, form of the statement in the bill as to novelty,
etc., is that the patentee is the "original and first inventor of the
alleged invention;" that the invention "had not been known or
used by others in this country, and had not been patented or
described in any printed publication in this or any foreign coun-
try before the invention and discovery thereof, and had not been
in public use or on sale for more than two years prior to the
application for letters p4tent, etc." The demurrer admits the
allegations of the complaint, and yet in spite of the admitted
novelty and utility of the invention, the insistent is that such
novelty and usefulness are really negatived by the letters patent
in question or by matters of common knowledge. Surely here
is a strange incongruity. And yet in cases where the courts have
particularly pointed out this glaring inconsistency resulting from
the contradiction of the pleading by the contention of the defend-
ant, the practice has been upheld and the demurrer sustained.Y
The excuse for this is undoubtedly that stated in Brown v.
Piper (supra), and to accomplish substantial justice, a seeming
inconsistency in the pleadings is waived or overlooked.
In the earlier cases decided by Judge Putnam,' it was said
that the Supreme Court had in no case distinctly approved nor
condemned the practice, as in N. Y. Belting and Packing Com-
pany v. N. J. Car Spring and Rubber Company "6 the decision of
the circuit court was reviewed without particularly or clearly pas-
sing on the practice. Since Judge Putnam's decision two decis-
ions have been handed down distinctly upholding the practice.
The first of these was that of Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works
v. Medart, -  and the suit was one of infringement on three patents
for belt pulleys and the manufacture of the same. The defen-
dant demurred to the bill on the ground that the patents did not
241ottle Seal Co. v. De La Vergne Bottle & Seal Co., 47 F. R. 59; Dick
v. Oil Well Supply Co., 25 F. R. IO5.
Indurated Fibre Industries Co. v. Grace, 52 F. R. 124.
26 137 U. S. 445-
1 58 U. S. 68.
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show invention upon their faces. The demurrer was argued and
overruled, and the case subsequently heard upon pleadings and
proof. From the decision of the lower court, appeal was taken,
and the Supreme Court (Justice Brown delivering the opinion),
held that the patents were invalid and the demurrer to the bill
should have been sustained. The decision relative to two of the
patents sued upon comes rather under that class of cases
alluded to earlier, where an inherent defect exists in the patent
-the patents being held functional, and a matter of degree,
respectively. But the third patent was defeated on the prior art
as set forth in the specification.
The second case by the Supreme Court 8 (the opinion again
being by Justice Brown) even more clearly approves the practice
which is under our consideration. Here the court says: "While
patent cases are usually disposed of upon bill, answer and proof,
there is no objection, if the patent be manifestly invalid upon its
face, to the point being raised upon demurrer, and the case being
determined on the issue so formed. We have repeatedly held
that a patent may be declared invalid for want of novelty, though
no such defense be set up in the answer."
Moreover the patent was held anticipated by the fact that all
the parts of the combination of the patent were well known, and
the court took judicial notice of such common knowledge, and
decided that there was mere aggregation of old parts and not
a patentable combination.
Even with this sanction of the Supreme Court, the practice
is still considered one to be availed of only in the clearest cases,
especially in view of the many patents of seeming great simplicity
which have been upheld by the Supreme Court after consider-
ing the evidence introduced in their support.8 "The court must
be able from the statements on the face of the patent, and from
common and general knowledge, to say that the want of invention
is so palpable that it is impossible that evidence of any kind
could show the fact to be otherwise.""
With such strictures as to the application of the practice,
many limitations may be expected in the utterances of the court
as to the questions of (i) what is the common knowledge to be
judicially noticed by the courts, and (2) how far the specification
of the patent may be considered as setting forth the prior art.
i. The court is not at liberty to apply any special or peculiar
28 Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158 U. S. 299.
29 Davock v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 67 F. R. 469, and cases cited therein.
30Am. Fibre Chamois Co. v. Buckskin Fibre Co., 72 F. R. 511.
221
YALZE LA t W JOUR-AL.
knowledge which it may possess, or apply to the patent the skill
possessed by experts, but may only apply that knowledge which
is possessed by ordinarily well-informed people.' Things within
the common knowledge and use of the people throughout the
country32 only are before the court. In one case3 where the
patent was for a walking track, Judge Shipman said: "I am not
aware of any common knowledge upon the subject of walking
tracks within doors," etc. The practical difficulty and danger
is in defining where special knowledge leaves off and common
knowledge begins.3" Various methods of determining what is
common knowledge have been suggested by counsel and con-
sidered by courts.
In the case of Brown v. Piper"2 (discussed above), the court,
after citing the cream treezer as an anticipation, quoted from
various encyclopedias and dictionaries. Acting on this sugges-
tion the court in American Fibre Chamois Company v. William-
son36 referred to various reviews, encyclopedias and Knight's
dictionary to prove that the patent was old. It might well be
asked, why limit the court to dictionaries, reviews, etc.,-why
not consider any sort of treatise, and all former patents, as em-
braced in the common knowledge, for it most certainly cannot
be urged that the ordinalily well informed person knows the con-
tents of encyclopedias, dictionaries, etc. When the Fibre
Chamois case, therefore, came before the appellate court, Judge
Taft reversed the decision," on the ground that the court had
gone out of the sphere of common knowledge into special. He
lays down the rule that the court may refer to books of this des-
cription to support his views, if he first can point out well known
instances easily within the actual knowledge of the court. In
other words that the court may refresh his memory by referring
to standard works. 8 but not create a knowledge thereby.
The same view was taken in Bottle Seal Company v. De La
Vergne Bottle and Seal Company, 9 and the further point was
raised whether earlier patents or designs could be considered in
establishing what was common knowledge. It was held that the
31 Cleveland Faucet Co. v. Vulcan Brass Co., 72 F. R. 507.
32 Root v. Sontag, 47 F. R. 3o.
11 Coop v. Physical Development Institute, 47 F. R. 899.
Eclipse Mfg. Co. v. Adkins, 36 F. R. 554.
3 91 U. S. 37.
36 69 F. R. 247.
37Am. Fibre Chamois Co. v. Buckskin Fibre Co., 72 F. R. 514.
38 Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37.
3 47 F. R. 63.
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only way by which knowledge of anticipating devices or letters
patent could be brought to the court was by due and legal proof.
"It has never been supposed that letters patent could be taken
judicial notice of by the courts. There is nothing in their char-
acter nor their contents to so dignify them. They are simply
contracts reduced to writing, capable of being recorded, and of
being proved in a particular way." So Judge Coxe held40 regard-
ing a number of exhibits introduced with the demurrer.
2. As to the extent in which the specification of the patent
may be considered as setting forth the prior art, there appears
to be an irreconcilable disagreement in the adjudged cases. On
the one hand there are numbers of cases in which the statements
of the patentee as to the previous methods or devices over which
he has improved, are taken as admissions on his part as to the
prior art, and from such statements the patentability of the par-
ticular patent decided. On the other hand courts have refused
to be bound by the statements as they appeared in the specifica-
tion, without an opportunity being given the complainant to
explain or construe such seeming admissions."1 Judge Putnam
gives utterance to the following 2, "A bill in equity does not
necessarily make all the statements of fact contained in a con-
tract or letters patent proper parts of the pleading by making
profert, or reciting the tenor at length. In letters patent the
claims become a fundamental part of the bill and so much of the
specification as is necessary to construe the claims. But all por-
tions which merely set forth the state of the art are like recitals
of facts in contracts or other instruments, more or less conclusive
on the party who sets them up, yet in law explainable and not
absolutely presumed to have been so alleged as to become the
subject of demurrer. * * * It is true that so far as the spe-
cification contains any representations which, if erroneous, may
be presumed to have misled the Patent Office to the detriment
of the public, the patentee may be estopped. On the other hand,
I do not understand that the law has gone so far as to forfeit a.
valuable patent because the patentee has inaptly or somewhat
inaccurately, described the state of the art, or that it conclusively
prohibits him from showing such inaptitude or inaccuracy, if it
also appears that the public has not been prejudiced thereby."I
In commenting on this language Judge Sage presents the oppo-
site view in Heaton Peninsular Button Co. v. Schlochtmeyer,"4
40 Lalance & Grojean Mfg. Co. v. Mosheim, 48 F. R. 452.
41 Coop V. Savage Physical Development Co., 47 F. R. 899.
42 Indurated Fibre Industries Co. v. Grace. 52 F. R. 124.
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(since affirmed by the circuit court of appeals in the Sixth Cir-
cuit"4 ), thus: "The patent is the title deed through which the com-
plainant must derive all his rights. It is the grant of a monop-
oly, and with rare exceptions, every statement of the prior state of
the art therein contained bears upon the construction, and is a
limitation of the grant. The description in the specification of
the existing art, and of the applicant's improvements, form the
representations upon which he obtains the grant. Having done
so, he is estopped to say that his representations were incorrect.
If the recitals of the state of the art do not tend to limit, explain,
or nullify the grant, they are of no possible pertinence, even if
the same facts were fully proved alizinde. If, on the other hand,
they do have such tendency, the patentee is bound thereby, and
the patent must be construed in the light of the facts so recited."
In two cases", the courts have declined to consider prior pat-
ents cited in the patent in suit, showing the prior art, as before
them for their consideration. The mere fact that reference is
made to a former patent, does not bring that patent to the knowl-
edge of the court or spread its claims or description upon the
record. It must be proved by legal testimony in the usual way.
Where the patent in issue contains a specific disclaimer, the
courts have considered such disclaimers as admissions on the part
of the patentee, and from them determined the prior art.
A minute study of the statements of the prior art in the pat-
ents in the various suits4 is apt to lead to the conclusion that
almost any statement in the patent may be considered by the
court as setting forth the prior art and as an admission and part
of the bill. Especially does this statement seem correct in view
of the Supreme Court case, Locomotive Works v. Medart", where
the court took the usual statement of the specification as to pre-
vious devices as an admission on the part of the patentee as to the
prior art.
If this conclusion is correct it behooves solicitors of patents
to be more careful of their statements of the prior art, or else
confine themselves strictly to a description of the device in hand




9 F. R. 592.
4472 F. R. 524.
41 Drainage Construction Co. v. Englewood Sewer Co., 67 F. R. X41;
Cleveland Faucet Co. v. Vulcan Brass Co., 72 F. R. 506.
4661 F. R. 291; 47 F. R. 309; 72 F. R. 5oS. and others.
47 158 U. S. 68.
